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MODERNIZING INVERSE
CONDEMNATION: A LEGISLATIVE
PROSPECTUS*
Arvo Van Alstyne**
The constitution of California' and the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment2 impose constitutional obligations upon
the state to pay "just compensation" to property owners injured as
a result of certain kinds of governmental action.' Despite its consti-
tutional origins, persuasive reasons exist for believing that this form
of liability for private injuries-typically referred to as "inverse
condemnation" liability-is amenable in significant respects to legis-
lative modification and that statutory changes would be desirable
in the interests of predictability and uniformity.4 Formulation of a
* This Article was prepared by the author for the California Law Revision Com-
mission and is published here with the Commission's consent. The Article was prepared
to provide the Commission with background information to assist it in its study of
inverse condemnation. However, the opinions, conclusions, and recommendations con-
tained in this Article are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent
or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recommendations of the California Law Revision
Commission.
The present article is the second instalment of the author's background in-
vestigation of inverse condemnation being conducted for the Law Revision Commis-
sion. The first instalment was published in April, 1967, as Van Alstyne, Statutory
Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L.
Rsv. 727 (1967).
** B.A. 1943, LL.B. 1948, Yale University. Professor of Law, University of Utah.
Member of the California Bar.
1 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
2 The due process clause makes applicable to the states the constitutional prin-
ciple of the 5th amendment: ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
3 The scope of inverse liability under the California constitution is broader than
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, since the former, unlike
the latter, requires payment of just compensation when private property is either
"taken" or "damaged" for public use. See Reardon v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885). Cf. Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d
250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965). Approximately half of the states have
constitutional clauses that require compensation for "damagings" as well as takings.
2 P. NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1[3] (3d rev. ed. 1963).
4 See Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope
of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REv. 727 (1967).
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rational legislative program, however, presupposes a measure of gen-
eral agreement upon premises and goals that are consistent with
practical experience, the needs of the public administration, and the
broad values of the legal system. In an effort to identify such com-
mon ground, the present study seeks to explore the theoretical as-
pects of inverse condemnation liability and to articulate, in the light
of prevailing theory, acceptable policy criteria that could serve as
guidelines to the evaluation of proposed statutory provisions ad-
dressed to specific aspects of the subject. Subsequent articles5 will
undertake detailed analysis of discrete phases of inverse condemna-
tion law and attempt to appraise and constructively criticize the
prevailing rules in light of these policy criteria.
The search for acceptable policy criteria for legislative reform
is, at best, a hazardous one beset with unresolvable doubts; the
results are thus advanced with diffidence. The criteria here set forth
are derived in part from an examination of judicial opinions applying
the rules of inverse condemnation to specific controversies, although
they are rarely articulated in terms in such opinions.' To an addi-
tional extent they are also reflected in statutes presently in effect
promulgating legislative standards of inverse liability and immunity;
but these statutory provisions are comparatively rare and are ordi-
narily limited in reach to highly particularized problems unlikely to
support helpful generalizations.7 To a considerable degree, these
criteria also have roots in analogous policy considerations incor-
porated in legislation defining the scope and limits of governmental
tort liability.8 Inverse condemnation functions in the field of tort
liability and has been, historically, one of the most conspicuous
techniques for avoidance of the traditional doctrine of governmental
tort immunity. It thus shares many of the substantive and procedural
features of governmental tort liability. Finally, policy criteria have
5 Additional phases of the present study, likewise under the auspices of the
California Law Revision Commission, are in preparation. As completed, they will be
submitted for publication in law reviews affiliated with California law schools. It is
anticipated that the California Law Revision Commission will, after completion of the
entire study, collect and republish all phases together as part of its REPORTS, RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND STUDIES.
6 For notable examples of policy discussion in the case law, see Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-16 (1922) (Holmes, J.) ; Albers v. County of
Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965) ; Bacich v. Board
of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
7 See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 742-44.
8 See Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Im-
munity: Number 1-Tort Liability oj Public Entities and Public Employees, in 4
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 801 (Cal. Law Revision Comm'n ed. 1963),
for a detailed statement of policy considerations which underlie the present govern-
mental tort liability statutes in California. Cf. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Lia-
bility: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463 (1963).
[Vol. 8
1967] MODERNIZING INVERSE CONDEMNATION 3
been adduced, in part, from study of the extensive legal literature
examining specific problems of constitutional responsibility for
taking or damaging of private propertyY
Preliminary identification of acceptable policy standards is
regarded as a highly desirable, if not indispensable, basis for formu-
lation of proposed statutory rules that are responsive to the specific
practical problems represented in recurring patterns of inverse con-
demnation claims, and which, at the same time, do not unduly
hobble the effective administration of the public business. To be
sure, policy evaluation may sometimes suggest conclusions of seem-
ingly academic interest only, since they are contrary to settled con-
stitutional norms as declared by the courts. 0 As indicated in the
preceding instalment of the present study, however, there are several
avenues for statutory reform, even assuming constitutional liability
as a basic datum point, that may bring the administration of such
liability into closer correspondence with acceptable policy." More-
over, it is equally possible that objective policy analysis may indicate
that prevailing rules denying compensability for certain kinds of
property losses or for losses in specified types of factual circum-
stances are inadequate or inequitable. If so, a rational legislative
program might well include a requirement that compensation be
paid, in certain cases, notwithstanding absence of constitutional
compulsion to do so.' 2
CLASSIFICATION OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIMS
Discussions of the law of inverse condemnation are all too often
blurred by a failure to distinguish clearly between fundamentally
different categories of circumstances in which inverse claims are
advanced.'" Moreover, the most thoughtful and constructive contri-
) The available periodical literature is too extensive to justify complete citation
at this point. Most of the important studies are cited herein passim. The most sig-
nificant contributions to policy evaluation are Michelman, Property, Utility and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1165 (1967); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits
of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3; Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) ; Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUPREE COURT PRxv. 63; and
Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALI. L. REv. 596
(1954).
10 It is assumed here that the focus of law reform should be directed primarily
to legislative changes. Accordingly, possible constitutional changes to modify the
scope or impact of inverse condemnation are not directly considered.
11 See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 776-85.
12 Id. at 770.
13 Legal scholarship has traditionally focused upon doctrinal developments. See,
e.g., Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REv.
596, 605-15 (1942); Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE
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butions to the legal literature, like the leading court decisions, often
tend to concentrate upon relatively discrete aspects of the general
problem, thereby tending somewhat to distort and overemphasize
special characteristics at the expense of a broader perspective. 4 The
natural tendency of litigants to construct legal arguments upon the
doctrinal framework of the applicable constitutional terminology,
couched mainly at a conceptual level, has also tended to produce a
mass of obtuse decisional law that is only occasionally relieved by
judicial common sense, pragmatism, and candor. 5
Understanding of the nature of the problem of legislative re-
form, and enhanced probability of defensible statutory proposals
relating to inverse condemnation, would be promoted by frank recog-
nition of the fact that the broad constitutional words upon which
inverse liability rests constitute an intentional delegation to the
courts of a limited power of judicial legislation. 16 The operative
terms are sufficiently indefinite to provide considerable flexibility to
judges-and, therefore, to the legislature-in assigning varieties of
meanings to the constitutional command that "just compensation"
be paid for private "property" that is "taken" or "damaged" for
"public use."'" Ideally, the significance attached to these terms
ought to reflect a carefully deliberated assessment of social, eco-
nomic, and fiscal implications of the actions of the public entity
that caused the injury in question, as well as the like implications
for the claimant and other property owners similarly situated and
exposed to the same risks. These competing interests, which approx-
L.J. 221 (1931). More recently, helpful studies that explicitly take into account the
practical complexities of the problem have appeared. See, especially, Mandelker,
Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis.
L. REV. 3; Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF.
L. REV. 596 (1954).
14 Useful studies of discrete aspects of inverse condemnation policy are plentiful.
See, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE COMm. ON PUBLIC WORKS, STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND
ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND
FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 499-512 (selected bibliography,
Comm. Print 1964).
15 See Broeder, Torts and Just Compensation: Some Personal Reflections, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 217, 228 (1965) (concluding that case law is "principally characterized
by ... highly ambiguous and irreconcilable decisions") ; Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny
County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962
SUPREME COURT REV. 63 (describing decisional law as a "crazy-quilt pattern").
16 That the delegation was intentional is shown by the legislative history of the
constitutional language. See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 771-76. Moreover, the courts
have acknowledged that the development of inverse condemnation law has been almost
entirely the product of judicial legislation. See, e.g., People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d
390, 395, 144 P.2d 799, 802 (1943) ; Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350,
144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
17 The current doctrinal flexibility of these terms is discussed in Van Alstyne,
supra note 4, at 749-68, 776-83. See also, Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The
Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 3.
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imate the interests identifiable with cause and effect relationships,
are central to the effectuation of eminent domain policy in the in-
verse context. They thus constitute a logically appropriate basis for
organizing the factual data, drawn from reported decisions, illustra-
tive of recurring circumstances that have historically generated in-
verse liability claims. Awareness of the diversities of fact situations
from which inverse liabilites and immunities have typically emerged
in the past should help to anchor the search for sound policy in
experience as well as theory.' 8
It is thus believed that a meaningful legislative prospectus can
best be developed by a detailed appraisal of a) the objectives and
related functional characteristics of governmental activities that tend
to produce inverse liability claims, and b) the qualitative and quanti-
tative impact of the kinds of property injuries that generally ensue
therefrom. The traditional doctrinal terminology in which most of
the literature is phrased should be avoided, wherever possible, in
this investigation, since the object is to expose the practical con-
siderations that bear upon the relativity of the competing interests
and thus elucidate relevant policy criteria. Accordingly, for the
purposes of the present study, factual situations tending to generate
inverse condemnation claims will be classified along practical lines
that underscore the significance of the dichotomy of cause and effect
but still accord primary importance to the nature of the govern-
mental action involved. Five distinguishable classes of cases may
be identified from this viewpoint:' 9
1. Physical destruction or confiscation of private property by
government officers in the course of official action20 deliberately con-
ceived and undertaken for that purpose with respect to that prop-
18 The methodology here recommended is closely analogous to that employed by
the California Law Revision Commission in its investigations and deliberations lead-
ing to the proposals that were enacted as the California Tort Claims Act of 1963,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-95.8 (West 1966). See Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to
Sovereign Immunity, in 5 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 1-538 (Cal. Law
Revision Comm'n ed. 1963); Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Recommendation Relating
to Sovereign Immunity: Number 1-Tort Liability of Public Entities and Public
Employees, in 4 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 801-32 (Cal. Law Revision
Comm'n ed. 1963).
19 The classification of inverse condemnation claims here suggested is proposed
as a useful but necessarily imperfect one. The diversities of factual elements com-
prising potential inverse claims are such that overlapping of the classifications is
unavoidable to some extent. Assignment of particular types of claims to specific
categories thus reflects, in part, the author's views as to the most fitting analysis for
present purposes.
20 The term "official action," and its synonyms, are here employed to refer to
any form of action by a public entity, state or local, in the pursuit of any authorized
public function or responsibility, whether facilitative, service, guardianship, or media-
tory in nature. As to the scope of the last-mentioned terms, see Van Alstyne, supra
note 4, at 735-36.
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erty. Illustrations include the abatement of plant or animal pests,2 '
demolition of buildings to prevent the spread of a conflagration 2 or
for enforcement of health and safety standards of building codes,23
and confiscation and forfeiture of property as a sanction to induce
compliance with police regulations.24
2. Physical harm to private property (i.e., by actual invasion,
destruction, or appropriation), caused by governmental activity not
deliberately calculated (as in category 1) to bring about the result
but rather to achieve some other appropriate objective, whether or
not the ensuing harm was foreseeable or a product of negligence.
Examples include claims involving flooding, erosion, landslides and
loss of lateral support, allegedly resulting from the construction or
maintenance of public improvements."
3. Financial loss intentionally imposed upon a property owner,
with or without physical harm to his property, by governmental
compulsion that the owner use his property in a certain manner, or
take or submit to prescribed action with reference to the property,
without compensation. Examples include claims for the cost of com-
pelled relocation of public utility structures to make way for public
improvements, 26 and for the value of dedications or contributions
exacted as the price of subdivision approvals, building permits, and
zoning variances. 7
4. Nonphysical or intangible harm to private property consist-
ing of loss or diminution of value, utility, attractiveness, or profita-
21 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of red cedar
trees to eradicate rust disease harmful to nearby apple orchards); Graham v. King-
well, 218 Cal. 658, 24 P.2d 488 (1933) (destruction of beehives and bees to eradicate
foulbrood disease).
22 See, e.g., Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879); Surocco v. Geary,
3 Cal. 69 (1853) ; Hall and Wigmore, Compensation for Property Destroyed to Stop
the Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL. L. REV. 501 (1907).
23 See, e.g., Albert v. City of Mountain Home, 81 Idaho 74, 337 P.2d 377 (1959)
McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 P. 1017 (1926). Cf. Armistead v.
City of Los Angeles, 152 Cal. App. 2d 319, 313 P.2d 127 (1957).
24 See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (seizure and destruction of fish nets
as means for enforcing fish and game regulations) ; Note, Forfeiture of Property Used
in Illegal Acts, 38 NOTRE DaE LAW. 727 (1963).
25 See Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1965) (landslide); House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25
Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 (1944) (flooding).
26 See, e.g., Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 713,
329 P.2d 289 (1958) (relocation of gas lines to make way for sewer pipes in public
street).
27 See, e.g., Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1960) (dedication of strip for widening of street as condition to grant of
zoning variance); Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1
(1949) (dedications of land as condition to approval of subdivision map). See gen-
erally, Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119
(1964).
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bility, caused by governmental non-regulatory activity, whether or
not the harm was a foreseeable or calculated consequence of that
activity, or was a product of negligence. Claims based on loss of
access, light, and air, caused by freeway construction, 8 and claims
grounded upon annoyance or interference with enjoyment due to
noise29 or noxious odors30 produced by governmental activities are
typical of this category.
5. Financial loss imposed upon a property owner, ordinarily
without physical harm to his property, by government regulatory
prohibition against specified use or development of property. Typical
examples include claims based upon restrictive zoning and land-
use controls resulting in impairment of market value or loss of
anticipated profits from commercial exploitation of the property.31
The attractiveness of the classification scheme here suggested
lies in its exposure of the functional relationship between the char-
acteristics of the governmental activity that causes the injury and
the nature of the resulting injuries sustained. For example, it seems
reasonable to anticipate that the policy considerations relevant to
compensability of affirmative fiscal burdens deliberately' imposed
upon some private property owners (e.g., costs of relocation of utility
facilities) in connection with the construction of a highway (claims
within category 3) may differ in both principle and persuasiveness
from those which relate to other private losses (e.g., impairment of
access or reduction in traffic flow) unintentionally produced by the
same project (claims within category 4). In addition, it is believed
that claims involving tangible or physical damage are likely to
involve similarities that may be overlooked or confused if treated
together with claims based on intangible losses allegedly reflected
in disparagement of market value. Finally, useful analogies and com-
parisons are deemed more likely to be perceived by considering like
forms of governmental action and private damage together.
The general scope of inverse condemnation claims, as will be
seen from the proposed classification scheme itself, is exceedingly
broad. The range of judicial decisions discussing the substantive
principles of inverse condemnation law is even broader. The reason
is that these principles serve three significant but distinguishable
28 See, e.g., Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (1964); Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
See generally, R. NETHERTON, CoNTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS (1963).
29 See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). See generally,
Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1373 (1965).
30 See Hassell v. City & County of San Francisco, 11 Cal. 2d 168, 78 P.2d 1021
(1938); Bloom v. City & County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. 503, 3 P. 129 (1884).
31 See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515,
370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). See
generally, Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
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purposes in litigation:32 (1) They are the basis for adjudication of
claims to just compensation predicated upon an alleged "taking"
or "damaging" where no affirmative eminent domain proceedings
were instituted.3 (2) They provide a doctrinal foundation for
determination of claims that compensation offered to be paid for
a conceded "taking" or "damaging" is inadequate or omits compen-
sable elements of value.34 (3) They comprise the doctrinal setting
for judicial review, and either invalidation or authentication, of
governmental action which is challenged on the ground that it ex-
ceeds the constitutional limits imposed by the eminent domain
clauses.35
In the last of these roles, the principles of inverse condemna-
tion operate in a somewhat abstract and strictly limited fashion.
This kind of litigation examines challenged governmental action
primarily in a prospective way, seeking to determine whether it
should be annulled or restrained in the interest of preventing a
threatened future taking or damaging of private property. Actual
damage often is nonexistent, since the threatened governmental
action has not yet been undertaken; or if some actual injury has
been in fact sustained, its extent may be either speculative or un-
certain in amount. For example, the conclusion, based on principles
of inverse condemnation, that a statute forbidding the mining of
coal in such a way as to cause subsidence of the overlying land sur-
face is constitutionally unenforceable, is quite a different judgment
from one awarding a specified amount of money as "just compensa-
tion" for the effective impairment by the statute, of the mining com-
pany's right to commercial exploitation of its coal deposits.
36
Where the pecuniary incidence of the private loss is still largely
prospective, restraint against enforcement of the statute will often
mitigate the threat of substantial (other than temporary) loss. When
this is the case, a demand for prospective pecuniary relief 37 may
32 See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT REv. 63, 71-73.
33 This is the typical proceeding known as "inverse condemnation." See Albers
v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965);
Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
34 The contention that additional compensation should be paid is often asserted
in connection with demands for additional severance damages in formal eminent
domain litigation. See, e.g., People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Symons, 54
Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960) ; People ex rel. Department of
Pub. Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960).
35 See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Department of Pub. Works, 67 A.C.
410, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967) (declaratory relief). Cf. Loma Portal Civic
Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708
(1964) (injunction).
36 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
37 The fact that the bulk of the damages sought are prospective in nature is not
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pose problems of judicial policy that are entirely absent from a
suit for injunctive relief. A decree that a statute is unenforceable, for
example, costs the government treasury little or nothing, apart from
losses chargeable to frustration of the statutory objective. A pecu-
niary award of damages for inverse compensation on the other
hand, may vindicate the statutory purpose, but at a heavy cost to
the fiscal resources of the public entity. Conversely, denial of equi-
table relief should not be assumed to represent precisely the same
assessment of policy considerations that would be appropriate to a
denial of monetary damages. If a substantial governmental improve-
ment, intended to facilitate important commercial and private insti-
tutional arrangements, has been brought into operational activity-
for example, a municipal airport-injunctive relief against the con-
tinuation of those activities for the reason that they "take" or
"damage" private property may well be denied on public policy
grounds and the claimant relegated to a monetary remedy.38
The underlying differences between a suit seeking to invalidate,
annul, or enjoin some type of prospective or uncompleted govern-
mental activity, and one for damages on the ground of inverse con-
demnation, however, represent primarily considerations of short-
range remedial rather than of long-range substantive policy. In the
end result, an injunction against the inception or continuation of
action that threatens to take or damage private property forces a
responsible political choice between termination or modification of
the program and use of affirmative eminent domain proceedings to
accomplish the ultimate objective without alteration. Functionally,
an award of inverse damages ratifies a completed choice between the
same alternatives. Accordingly, both types of cases may be con-
sidered as equally authoritative, insofar as they bear upon the basic
issues of substantive policy.
POLICY PERSPECTIVE: APPROACHES TO
COMPENSABILITY THEORY
The range and diversity of inverse claims embraced by the
proposed classification scheme suggests the desirability of seeking to
identify a comprehensive theory of compensability for takings and
damagings with a sweep adequate to embrace all such claims. The
two most prominent features of the inverse condemnation cases that
necessarily an impediment to present adjudication and award, provided there is a
rational and non-speculative basis for determination of their effect upon present value.
See 4 P. NIcHoLs, EMIENT DoMAml § 14.241 (3d rev. ed. 1962).
38 See Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394
P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
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might be regarded as potential foundations upon which a broad
theoretical structure could be erected appear, unfortunately, to be
inadequate for the purpose.
The first feature is the persistent influence, in the background
of the judicial development of inverse liability, of the now discredited
doctrine of governmental tort immunity.39 The use of inverse con-
demnation as an "escape" from the immunity defense, which was
available only in tort litigation,4" produced a close similarity, and
often a direct overlapping, of tort and inverse doctrine; judicial
shaping of the rules governing the latter basis of liability was un-
doubtedly influenced substantially by a judicially felt need to temper
the rigors of governmental immunity." The recent abolition of
governmental immunity in California, and its replacement by a
statutory regime of qualified liability,4 2 has left the legacy of im-
munity-inspired case law as a continuing gloss upon the law of in-
verse condemnation.
The overlap with tort liability concepts, however, can scarcely
be regarded as a smoothly articulated or logically consistent legal
pattern; its characteristics are patchwork and expediency. The in-
herent limitation of inverse theory to property losses, for example,
has restricted its utility as a technique for by-passing governmental
immunity. The most extensive area of overlap relates to nuisance,
a basis of tort liability that previously was regarded as a partial
exception to governmental immunity44 but which, probably because
of greater predictability, was often assimilated within the purview of
39 The demise of the immunity doctrine has recently accelerated. For a survey
indicating that it has been largely discredited or abandoned in over one-third of the
states, see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 919.
40 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942). Cf. Brandenburg v. Los
Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 45 Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (1941).
41 See A. VAr ALSTYNE, CALIORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY § 1.18, 1.19
(1964). See also, Foster, Tort Liability Under Damage Clauses, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 1
(1952); Comment, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 403 (1963); Comment, 38 WASH. L. REV. 607
(1963).
42 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-95.8 (West 1966). See generally, A. VAN ALSTYNE,
supra note 41.
43 Inverse condemnation, for example, is not available as a remedy for personal
injuries or wrongful death. Brandenburg v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist.,
45 Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (1941). Moreover, no recovery can be had unless
the plaintiff can establish that an interest recognized as private "property" has been
taken or damaged. See Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Department of Pub. Works, 67
A.C. 410, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
44 See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 219, 359 P.2d 457, 462,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1961), pointing out that under the regime of governmental
immunity, "there is governmental liability for nuisances even when they involve
governmental activity."
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inverse condemnation litigation.45 Today, paradoxically, the nuisance
phase of inverse condemnation law is important for two entirely dif-
ferent reasons. It provides initially a constitutionally grounded tech-
nique for avoidance of the rule, expressed by statute, that a condi-
tion or activity expressly authorized by statute is not a nuisance,46
thus limiting the power of the legislature to authorize, and concur-
rently immunize from liability, governmental projects that would
otherwise be actionable nuisances.47 Secondly, it constitutes a de-
fensible (but not necessarily exclusive) basis for imposing liability
upon governmental entities for nuisance-type injuries, notwithstand-
ing the deliberate refusal of the California Legislature to include
nuisances within the scope of cases for which governmental tort
liability was authorized by the California Tort Claims Act of 1963.48
In these two respects, then, prevailing theories of tort liability are
opposed to, rather than supportive of, established inverse condem-
nation law.
In other respects, also, the relationship between tort and inverse
concepts is somewhat strained. A privileged trespass upon private
property, nonactionable on a tort theory, may, for example, be the
basis for an inverse condemnation judgment.49 Again, past decisions
have often repeated the formalistic rule that an injurious act of
a governmental entity is not actionable on inverse condemnation
grounds unless, as between private persons similarly situated, the
same injury would be a valid basis for a private tort action."° It is
45 See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus,
10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463, 493-98 (1963).
46 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3482 (West 1954) ("Nothing which is done or maintained
under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance") has been con-
strued narrowly, so that general statutory authority to engage in a particular activity
will not be deemed to constitute authority to create a nuisance, or a defense to lia-
bility for so doing. See, e.g., Ambrosini v. Alisal Sanitary Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d
720, 317 P.2d 33 (1957). Although no decision has explicitly so stated, it is probable
that this interpretation reflects judicial understanding that the underlying rationale
of the nuisance liability of public agencies, at least where property damage is con-
cerned, is grounded upon inverse condemnation. See Van Alstyne, supra note 45.
Moreover, it seems self-evident that a statute cannot immunize a public entity from
liability imposed by constitutional compulsion. See Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123
P.2d 505 (1942) ; 2 P. NicHOLS, EMINENT Dos-r1iN § 6.33 (3d rev. ed. 1963). Hence,
cautious counsel suing upon a statutory tort cause of action will often, where tenable,
join therewith a count in inverse condemnation. See, e.g., Granone v. County of Los
Angeles, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965).
47 2 P. NiCHOLs, EMINENT DomivN § 6.4433 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
48 See A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 41 at §§ 5.9-.10.
49 Id. at §§ 1.22, 1.26. Trespass, however, was actionable on an inverse con-
demnation theory in appropriate cases. See Jacobsen v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 319,
219 P. 986 (1923).
50 See, e.g., Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d
603, 364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961); Clement v. State Reclamation Bd, 35
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now clear that this formula was inaccurate and an oversimplifica-
tion, and is not to be taken as either a conclusive test or limitation
upon the scope of inverse liability." Its historical persistence, how-
ever, still tends to fog the case law.
These theoretical and conceptual discrepancies that, as a by-
product of sovereign immunity, have been introduced into the law
of inverse condemnation suggest that any effort to construct a viable
theory of inverse compensability upon the tort analogue would be
unproductive. The existing inconsistencies, for example, plague anal-
ysis by making it difficult to distinguish and sort out the elements
of overlapping factual circumstances into their respective tort and
inverse condemnation components. To a considerable degree, of
course, difficulties of this order may be meaningless in a broader
view of the extent to which private losses occasioned by govern-
mental activities should be socialized through loss-distributing mech-
anisms such as damage awards by courts. The danger is that the
broad view may be lost in the glare of tort-inverse similarities. It
should not be forgotten that liability may be imposed by constitu-
tional compulsion in certain situations-for example, cases lacking
in a showing of fault, or cases in which foreseeability of harm is
wholly wanting-in which tort principles would preclude any award
of damages to the injured property owner. 2 Conversely, over-atten-
tion to the tort analogue may beguile the observer into all too ready
an acceptance of the view that if tort liability normally would not be
available, as a matter of law, as between private persons on like
facts, inverse condemnation liability must also be inappropriate.
This view, unfortunately, overlooks situations in which inverse
liability may be supported by sound considerations relevant to the
constitutional principles that inform the law of eminent domain,
although tort liability may be withheld by applicable statutory law
for reasons appropriate to the administration of tort law."
It seems evident from the preceding discussion that the principal
significance of government tort law to a policy analysis of inverse
Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950) ; Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119
P.2d 1 (1941).
51 Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1965).
52 Id. See also, Reardon v. City & County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317
(1885).
53 In a variety of situations, the same facts will support a claim based upon
inverse condemnation concepts, as well as a statutory claim for injury resulting from
a dangerous condition of public property. See, e.g., Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45
Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955). The statutory provisions which govern the latter
claim, however, establish a number of immunities and defenses which would not
necessarily be applicable to the inverse condemnation claim, See A. VAN ALSTYNE,
supra note 41 at §§ 6.28-.43.
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condemnation is not in the realm of theory, but at the level of reme-
dial policy. When payment of compensation for property injuries is
indicated as sound policy, the availability of an adequate tort remedy
may suggest that a duplicating inverse remedy is unnecessary; con-
versely, if a tort remedy is presently denied, a choice may be neces-
sary between liberalization of the tort law and implementation of the
inverse condemnation route to adjudication. In the latter situation,
also, where governmental tort immunity still prevails, the need for a
particularly searching appraisal of policy criteria relevant to inverse
liability is at its maximum, not only because policy considerations rel-
evant to tort liability have presumably already been resolved against
liability, but because a similar resolution opposing inverse liability
will leave the injured claimant without an effective remedy.
A second potential premise for the elaboration of a theory of
constitutional compensability relates to the oft-observed distinction
between governmental exercise of the "police power" as distinguished
from the "eminent domain" power. The tendency of some courts to
emphasize this conceptualized duality of governmental functions as a
framework for deciding issues of inverse compensability is so pro-
nounced and its examples so numerous 54 as to suggest the possibility
that it represents general theoretical considerations, however dimly
perceived or intuitively felt by judges, that militate against reim-
bursement for injuries sustained from "police power" actions and fa-
vor compensability when "eminent domain" is used. A review of the
relevant legal literature, however, discloses that efforts to identify
and describe the essential characteristics that distinguish the two
kinds of governmental powers subsumed by the distinction have pro-
duced much in the way of dilemma and disagreement and little, if
anything, that can be described as basic consensus.55
At least six different levels of analysis are reflected in the schol-
arly discussions:
(1) Physical invasion v. regulation. A physical encroachment
upon, or use or occupation of, a privately owned asset of economic
value is often regarded as characteristic of eminent domain power,
while prescription of a regulation of conduct with respect to the use
54 See Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort,
38 WASH. L. REV. 607 (1963); Kucera, Eminent Domain Versus Police Power-A
Common Misconception, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1959 INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN
I (Southwestern Legal Foundation ed. 1959).
55 The major contributions in the legal literature and cases are collected and
critically discussed in Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
Basic philosophical assumptions of inverse condemnation policy are explored in
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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of economic resources is usually classified as a police power mea-
sure.5 In more sophisticated but not essentially dissimilar versions,
the distinction is sharpened by introduction of the purpose of the
governmental action-protection of the public health, safety, and
welfare being a clue to police power, while acquisition or enlargement
of the fund of public assets is deemed to be a mark of eminent do-
main.57 Or, putting it in engagingly simple terms, police power seeks
to restrict property rights out of necessity, while eminent domain
seeks to appropriate such rights because they are useful."8
It may be readily conceded that this way of looking at the prob-
lem of inverse condemnation possesses an undeniable element of use-
fulness where actual physical occupation or taking over of privately
owned land or improvements (i.e., the most obvious forms of "prop-
erty") are concerned. 9 Compensation is normally awarded in such
cases, 6° and the results can usually be verbalized in familiar legal
terms as the acquisition by the governmental entity of a typical inter-
est in the land."' On the other hand, it fails to provide a useful ratio-
nale for identifying or explaining those situations in which compensa-
tion for physical destruction or taking over of private property is ex-
ceptionally denied. 2 Nor does it draw a meaningful line indicating at
what point regulations of conduct or use go so far as to be regarded as
a compensable taking notwithstanding the absence of physical appro-
priation. 3
The appropriation-regulation approach has other deficiencies
apart from its inability to explain major areas of inverse case law. 4 It
assumes that the objectives to be secured by appropriation cannot be
56 See 1 P. NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.42, 1.42[2] (3d rev. ed. 1964).
57 See Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort,
38 WASH. L. REv. 607 (1963).
58 See Note, Freeways and the Rights of Abutting Owners, 3 STAN. L. REV. 298,
302 (1951).
59 See 2 P. NIcHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 6.2-.23[3] (3d rev. ed. 1963).
60 E.g., Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947)
(temporary occupation to store construction materials); Granone v. County of Los
Angeles, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965) (flooding).
01 See MICHELMAN, supra note 55, at 1187.
62 Familiar examples include Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction
of cedar trees to protect apple orchards from cedar rust) ; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133 (1894) (destruction of fishnets which were unlawful to use under existing
regulations). See also, Brown, Eminent Domain in Anglo-American Law, 18 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 169 (1965).
63 Compare Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), with Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Cf. In re Clinton Water Dist., 36
Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950) (regulation forbidding recreational use of reservoir
held a compensable damaging of riparian rights). Obviously, to deny compensation
solely because there has been no physical invasion would be preposterous. See Sax,
supra note 55, at 47-48.
64 See generally, Michelman, supra note 55, at 1226-29.
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obtained through regulation, where in reality appropriation and regu-
lation often are simply alternate techniques for achieving the same
result. Protection or airport approaches from avigation hazards, for
example, could be secured either by condemnation of a servitude or
by land use regulation, with identical impact upon the exploitation
potential of land beneath the approach areas, but with potentially di-
vergent consequences for compensability of the land owners.65 In ef-
fect, under modern sophisticated notions of the varieties of interests
in land that are assimilated within the "property" concept,6 most
regulatory impositions can readily be verbalized as appropriations of
property, and the ultimate purposes of many physical appropriations
may be accomplished with equal efficacy through carefully tailored
regulations.6 7 To postulate a difference in conclusions regarding com-
pensability upon the supposed distinction between physical invasions
or appropriations and regulations of use is thus to subject such results
to the danger of manipulation and inequality of treatment of essen-
tially like claims.
Finally, the questionable value of this theoretical approach
seems to be even further reduced in a jurisdiction where, like Calif or-
nia, the constitution requires payment of just compensation for a
"damaging" as well as a "taking" of private property. It is clear, his-
torically, that the damage clauses were introduced precisely for the
purpose of enlarging compensability beyond the outer limits seem-
ingly marked by traditional judicial acceptance of physical invasion
as the test of a "taking." 8
The appropriation-regulation approach thus seems to possess
very dubious utility as a tool of legal analysis. Its principal signifi-
cance, perhaps, lies in the implicit suggestion that when a physical in-
vasion, appropriation, or use by government of private assets occurs,
a presumption should arise favoring payment of the constitutionally
required compensation. This presumption, however, is only a starting
point for further analysis. It may be dispelled by other considera-
tions; and its absence in a particular case, because of lack of physical
65 Legislative recognition of police power and eminent domain as alternate tech-
niques is illustrated by the airport approach zoning law. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 50485.2 (police power), 50485.13 (eminent domain) (West 1966).
66 See Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV.
691 (1938); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note, Ch. 1 (1936).
67 See Waite, Governmental Power and Private Property, 16 CATHOLIC U. L.
REV. 283, 284-85 (1967); Michelman, supra note 55, at 1185-87. Cf. Cormack, Legal
Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221 (1931).
68 Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888); Reardon v. City & County of San
Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885); Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64
(1882); Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 771-76; Lenhoff, Development of the Concept
of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUm. L. REV. 596 (1942).
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appropriation, does not foreclose compensability in any way, nor
even create a contrary presumption. Its analytical worth is, obvi-
ously, of exceedingly modest dimensions.
(2) Diminution of value. Another theoretical approach, often
expressed in judicial opinions,69 emphasizes the magnitude of the
property owner's loss as the key to compensation. Focussing atten-
tion not upon the nature of the power being exercised, but upon the
quantitative impact of the imposition, this view intimates that large
deprivations normally call for compensation to be paid while small
ones-those properly assimilated within the idea of the "petty lar-
ceny" of the police power-are noncompensable. 70
Like the physical invasion approach, this one, too, fails to pro-
vide an adequate framework for reconciliation of the decisions. It is
clear that some types of governmental action may, with impunity, de-
stroy enormous economic values, while other kinds of relatively mi-
nor losses regularly command compensation. 71 Moreover, unless
qualified in major respects, a test based solely on diminution of value
would have a potential impact upon vast areas of governmental activ-
ities to a pervasive degree that finds support neither in decisional law
nor acceptable policy.72 Finally, except as a vague invitation to idio-
syncratic judgment,7" the suggested test incorporates no standards
for determining at what point the line between compensable and non-
609 1 P. NICnOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42[7] (3d rev. ed. 1964).
70 This approach is generally attributed to Justice Holmes. See Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (majority opinion); Tyson v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418, 445-46 (1925) (dissenting opinion) ; Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 53 N.E.910 (1899) (Holmes, C. J.). The "petty larceny" phrase also is Holmes'. 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS 457 (Howe ed. 1953). Whether Holmes himself fully accepted the
diminution-of-value approach is open to question. See Michelman, supra note 55, at
1190 n.53; Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 761-62.
71 See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370
P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (reviewing
the cases). On the other hand, minor pecuniary losses for actual takings of negligible
portions of private parcels of real property are fully compensable, even though the
benefits to be realized from the public improvement and to be reflected in enhanced
value of the parts not taken will clearly exceed the most generous estimate of the
value of what was taken. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248(3) (West Supp. 1966)
as amended, Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 51, § 1; Contra Costa County Water Dist. v. Zucker-
man Constr. Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 908, 50 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1966).
72 See Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 496, 53 N.E. 910, 911 (1899) (Holmes,
C.J.) (dictum) "... [W1e assume that even the carrying away or bodily destruction
of property might be of such small importance that it would be justified under the
police power without compensation. We assume that one of the uses of the convenient
phrase, police power, is to justify those small diminutions of property rights, which,
although within the letter of constitutional protection, are necessarily incident to thefree play of the machinery of government." (Emphasis added.) See generally, Spater,
Noise and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1373 (1965).
73 See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 63, 75-81; Sax, Tak-
ings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 50-53 (1964).
[Vol. 8
1967] MODERNIZING INVERSE CONDEMNATION 17
compensable impositions should be drawn. It is not even clear
whether diminution of value is to be taken as an independent or rela-
tive standard, or, if the latter, with what basis of comparison the pe-
cuniary impact is to be appraised.74
Despite its deficiencies, however, it seems evident that degree of
loss is a relevant factor to be taken into account in formulating a con-
sistent body of inverse condemnation practice. On the one hand, the
sheer costs of administering a compensation scheme which failed to
rule out some claims as de minimis, too speculative, or unprovable
might well impose fiscal burdens which impair the general welfare
out of all proportion to the more equitable cost allocations that might
result.7" Moreover, in a large variety of situations where private
losses are readily identifiable as products of public programs, avail-
able techniques of social cost accounting are probably inadequate to
strike a meaningful pecuniary calculation of the net extent to which
losses are not offset by benefits. 6 Yet there are a number of typically
recurring situations in which the magnitude of private loss from pub-
lic activities seems compellingly relevant-especially where the ex-
tent of private deprivation serves as an index to identification with
certainty of those owners who have sustained the burden of the pub-
lic program in disproportionate degree to their neighbors through ob-
vious frustration of reasonable investment-supported expectations.77
As with the physical invasion approach, diminution of value may thus
be helpful in supporting determination that compensation should be
required in certain instances; but it is wanting in criteria for deter-
mining when, despite substantial losses, compensation is not constitu-
tionally required.
(3) Balancing of public advantage against private detriment. Ju-
dicial lip-service has probably been paid more often to the process of
balancing of the competing interests, as the most feasible approach to
disposition of inverse condemnation issues, than to any other.78 To
74 See Michelman, supra note 55 at 1191-93.
75 See Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF.
L. REV. 596, 611 (1954); note 72, supra. Remote and speculative damages are nor-
mally nonrecoverable. 4 P. NicHoLs, EMINENT DovAIN § 14.241 (3d rev. ed. 1962).
76 The inadequacies in social cost accounting techniques help to explain the
usual judicial insistence that compensation is constitutionally available only for
"special" but not for "general" damage, see Lenhoff, Development of the Concept
of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596, 612-13 (1942); Reardon v. City &
County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885) ; City of Los Angeles v. Geiger,
94 Cal. App. 2d 180, 210 P.2d 717 (1949), and that only "special" benefits are to be
credited against severance damages in computing just compensation. See Haar &
Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 833
(1963).
77 See Michelman, supra note 55, at 1233.
78 See Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1965); Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 75, at 626-29; Comment, Dis-
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some extent, this "test" probably is derived from the close analogy
which inverse condemnation is deemed to bear to common law nui-
sance liability, where a similar balancing process is typically urged as
the appropriate technique.7" In a larger sense, of course, it is merely a
manifestation of the tendency of modern jurisprudence to regard liti-
gation as primarily a process for resolution of conflicts between com-
peting social and economic interests represented by the contending
parties.80 In our present context, the test implies that compensation
need not be paid for takings and damagings of private property which
are "outweighed" by the social gains resulting from the governmental
action under attack.81
The balancing process, while superficially attractive and famil-
iar, has some obvious inadequacies. It appears to be ethically
indefensible if taken to mean that the law will permit the valuable
interests of some members of society to be sacrificed, without com-
pensation, for the benefit of others, in the absence of any criteria
(other than the purely fortuitous circumstance of ownership in a cer-
tain location) for justifying the selection of membership of the two
groups.82 If, however, it is understood to require denial of compensa-
tion only when all members of the community, including those spe-
cially harmed, have received (or will receive at least) an "average
reciprocity of advantage" 83 which fully offsets their losses, some
members will ordinarily receive gratuitously valuable special benefits
to the disparagement of the egalitarian component of our political
and social ethics. As long as general confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of public officials prevails, the latter consequence may
perhaps be tolerated in view of the likelihood that, in the long run,
windfall benefits will be redistributed generally throughout the com-
munity by taxation or other economic mechanisms.84
A more practical difficulty with the balancing approach lies in its
assumption that courts (and juries) are capable of making reason-
ably accurate quantitative comparisons between the public and pri-
tinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort, 38 WASH. L. REV. 607
(1963).
79 See Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 75, at 611-12.
80 See 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE ch. 14 (1959); C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON,
W. HURST, & S. MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS 66-148 (1961); Fuller, American Legal
Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1934).
81 See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515,
370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). Cf.
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ; United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
82 See Michelman, supra note 55, at 1195.
83 The divergent meanings which may be attached to this phrase are emphasized
in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922).
84 See Michelman, supra note 55, at 1196.
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vate interests assertedly in competition. Identification of what those
interests are is not always an easy task in itself, 5 and there is a com-
plete absence of any meaningful calculus for weighing and comparing
what are essentially dissimilar factors.8" Balancing thus, in practice,
tends to appear to be unduly subjective and devoid of identifiable
bases for predictability of results except where repeated adjudication
has crystallized rules of thumb.
The widespread acceptance of the balancing approach, despite
its defects, is accountable in two ways. It appears to provide a ra-
tional and (at least on one assumption) not ethically disturbing
framework for appraising in a gross and approximate way the extent
to which government has visited unnecessary and grievous losses on
individuals without commensurate conferring of either economic ad-
vantages or community amenities.8 7 Presumably the most obvious
cases for and against compensability will be exposed by the process;
but it is clearly a meat ax rather than a finely honed scalpel. On the
other hand, the flexibility of the balancing approach makes it attrac-
tive to appellate courts seeking for an open-ended technique with
which to shape gradually the contours of a consistent and pragmatic-
ally operable body of law.
(4) Harm prevention and benefit extraction. A thoughtful stu-
dent of our present problem has suggested that the distinction be-
tween a compensable taking and a noncompensable regulation can
best be drawn by assessing the purpose of the governmental imposi-
tion.8 If a limitation upon private land uses, for example, seeks pri-
marily to prevent nuisance-like conduct in the interest of protecting
the community welfare, compensation should not be awarded; but if
the regulation seeks to compel an innocent owner involuntarily to
85 See Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 75, at 610; Comment, Distinguishing
Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort, 38 WASH. L. REv. 607, 616-17 (1963).
As to the evolving and changing nature of acceptable police power purposes, see
Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484-85, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925).
86 See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 41-46 (1964); Hey-
man & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on
New Subdivision Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1127
(1964); Ribble, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on Municipal Discretion in
Zoning Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv. 689, 692 (1930). Cf. Comment, 11 KAN. L. REv.
388 (1963). Some cases intimate that "emergency" or "pressing necessity" must
characterize the public interest in order to justify denial of compensation, but are
uninformative as to the standards for identifying the presence or absence of these ele-
ments. See, e.g., Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943);
Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 731, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
87 See Michelman, supra note 55, at 1235.
88 Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLum. L. REv.
650 (1958). See also, Dunham, Property, City Planning, and Liberty, in LAW AND
LAND 28 (C. Haar ed. 1964); Dunham, City Planning: An Analysis of the Content
of the Master Plan, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 170 (1958).
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confer a benefit upon the community, payment of compensation
should be required in order to distribute more equitably the costs of
the benefit thus made available. In this approach, a regulation for
harm-prevention purposes normally is of narrow and particularized
dimensions, aimed to elimination of a detrimental use, but leaving a
broad area in which private options are available for engaging in
other useful but non-harmful activities. A ban on brickyards in a resi-
dential area provides an example.8 9 Conversely, a regulation designed
to confer a benefit tends to impose more comprehensive limitations on
private choice, leaving the owner free only to abandon all activities
that are economically feasible or engage in the kind of private use
which will confer the desired benefit. Limitation of commercially val-
uable buildable land solely for use as a parking lot" or a wildlife
sanctuary9 illustrate situations requiring compensation under this
view.
As the principal proponent of this approach has recognized,92
the harm-benefit distinction is not an easy one to apply, for benefit of
some sort is normally identifiable in connection with all types of re-
strictions.9" As social policy becomes increasingly permissive with re-
gard to the scope of legislative power affirmatively to promote the
general welfare, the line between harm-prevention and benefit extrac-
tion becomes blurred, appearing to be more a matter of degree than of
qualitative substance.94 This approach thus tends to be ambiguous
and difficult to apply to concrete situations with consistency and as-
surance. 95 It is far from obvious that a measure limiting the height of
structures that may be built in an airport approach zone is a compen-
sable conferring of benefits through enhancement of airport service,
rather than the prevention of a use (for tall buildings) which threat-
ens the safety of airport users and neighbors.96 Similarly, it is not en-
89 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
90 Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d
517 (1954).
91 Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills.
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
92 Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 50 CoLUM. L. REV
650, 664 (1958).
93 See Mandelker, Notes From the English: Compensation in Town and Countr3
Planning, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 703 (1961).
94 Comment, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 96, 106 (1966).
95 See Michelman, supra note 55, at 1197-1200, pointing out that "harmful" uses
tend to be a shifting component of space, time, and community development patterns.
96 The dual purpose of airport approach zoning is underscored by the California
Legislature's declaration of purpose which prefaces the Airport Approaches Zoning
Law. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 50485.2 (West 1966) states that ". . . an airport hazard en-
dangers the lives and property of users of the airport and of occupants of land in its
vicinity . . . [but, in addition, also] in effect reduces the size of the area available
for the landing, taking off and maneuvering of the aircraft, thus tending to destroy
or impair the utility of the airport and the public investment therein." To the same
effect, see ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 15 1/2, § 48.11 (1963).
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tirely clear that a ban on billboards along highways is calculated to
prevent harmful roadside deterioration and distraction of motorists,
rather than to confer a benefit of beauty, recreational amenity, and
preserved public investment. 7
As a test for compensability, then, the harm-benefit distinction
poses practical problems that greatly reduce its usefulness, although
it does afford a cogent clue to the kinds of regulatory measures which
can sometimes be enforced without compensation.""
(5) Enterprise function v. arbitral function. Closely related to
the immediately preceding approach is the suggestion, recently ad-
vanced by Professor Joseph Sax, that compensability of government-
ally imposed losses should be determined by differentiating between
governmental acquisition and governmental arbitration.9" Under this
view, if private economic losses are a consequence of governmental
action that "enhances the economic value of some governmental en-
terprise," payment of just compensation is constitutionally required;
but if private loss results from governmental activities aimed at a
"resolution of conflict within the private section of society," through
an exercise of governmental power to arbitrate as between the com-
peting claims and shifting values that comprise "property," compen-
sation is not required. 0 Underlying this approach is a rejection of
the view that protection of existing economic values is central to the
purposes of the eminent domain clauses; on the contrary, Professor
Sax advances the thought that the framers were concerned primarily
with preventing the self-aggrandizing propensities of arbitrary and
tyrannical government.'
Unfortunately, the enterprise-arbitral approach has some of the
same deficiencies as the harm-benefit theory.102 The determination
whether a particular regulatory measure falls at one end or the other
of the conceptual yardstick encounters inherent ambiguities that are
characteristically involved in any effort to appraise legislative pur-
pose and effect. The solutions reached when government seeks to rec-
oncile and arbitrate competition between private interests often-
indeed, usually-reflect a multitude of shifting and elusive considera-
tions which include some properly regarded as enterprise-enhancing.
97 Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5288(a) (West Supp. 1966): "The regula-
tion of advertising structures adjacent to any state highway . . . is hereby declared to
be necessary to promote the public safety, health, welfare, convenience and enjoyment
of public travel, to protect the public investment in such highways, to preserve the
scenic beauty of lands bordering on such highways . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
98 Michelman, supra note 55, at 1235-45.
99 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
100 Id. at 67.
101 Id. at 53-60.
102 See Michelman, supra note 55, at 1200-01.
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Moreover, many measures undoubtedly include aspects of both enter-
prise and arbitral objectives.1 13
For example, an airport approach zoning measure enacted by a
city might well reflect (a) an appraisal of both intangible and eco-
nomic values inuring to the community from encouragement of air
transportation facilities, (b) a decision favoring both private and
public airport operations generally as against some but not all com-
peting interests in private land development adjacent to airports, and
(c) a desire to limit the cost of development of a particular publicly-
owned airport or of a projected public park on the periphery of an
airport. The first of these objects seems anomalous when judged
by the present approach; the second appears to be a mixed arbitral
and enterprise decision; and the third is clearly an enterprise-en-
hancing decision.
Moreover, it seems that the enterprise-arbitral approach cannot
be employed intelligently without taking into account the specific ad
hoc application of the measure under consideration. Thus, an airport
approach height restriction would, apparently, require payment of
compensation if invoked to limit development of private property lo-
cated adjacent to a publicly operated airport, but not if applied to
like property on the periphery of a privately owned and operated air-
port. In the former situation, its application appears to be enterprise-
enhancing; in the latter, it appears to be predominantly arbitral. Yet
where the impact upon private resource development is substantially
identical and the same public purpose is equally promoted in each
case, it is difficult to see why different results are required, let alone
permitted.'0°
103 See Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort,
38 WASH. L. REV. 607 (1963). A good example is provided by the railroad grade
crossing elimination cases. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953), sustaining imposition upon railroad of substantial
share of cost of construction of highway underpass. Under the "enterprise-arbitral"
approach, the entire cost of such construction should be borne by the public entity
requiring the grade separation to be built, since the result is enterprise-enhancing in
the sense that grade separations increase the value of utility of public streets. See
Sax, supra note 99, at 70. However, Professor Sax does not explain why these cases
cannot, with reason, be regarded as essentially arbitral, in that the policy of requiring
grade separations appears to represent an adjustment promotive of public health
and safety as between the competing demands of railroad users (carriers and shippers)
and highway users (motorists, truckers, shippers by truck). In addition, it seems
apparent that grade separations also enhance the value and utility of railroad trackage,
a factor which would seem to justify shifting part of the fiscal burden to the
benefited railroad.
104 Sax, supra note 99, at 69, concludes that compensation should be paid in air-
port approach zoning cases, since such zoning unambiguously is intended, and in fact
operates, to enhance the value of the public airport. But see note 96, supra. The
argument, however, overlooks the fact that such zoning regulations ordinarily are
general in application, and thus operate for the advantage of competing public and
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Similarly, in Miller v. Schoene,"'0 which Professor Sax charac-
terizes as a "correct" decision,' 1 compensation for compulsory de-
struction of cedar trees was denied, where this action was deemed es-
sential to protect nearby apple orchards from cedar rust harbored by
such trees. It is surely far from clear, however, that mere arbitration
of conflicting private uses was at stake.1"7 The dominant position of
the apple industry in the economy of Virginia surely connotes the ex-
istence of indirect public enterprise-enhancement considerations in
the background. Can it be safely assumed that the apple industry was
exclusively "private," entirely divorced from government involve-
ment in the form of direct and indirect subsidies or controls which, in
effect, might have made that industry to some extent a mixture of
public and private enterprise? 0 8 It is hardly a sufficient answer to
problems of this sort to insist that collateral and indirect benefits to
public enterprises are to be excluded in applying the test.10 9 To so
qualify it would introduce the problem of drawing a line between
"direct" and "indirect" benefits, thereby adding to the already for-
midable ambiguities of the approach.
The enterprise-arbitral theory does appear to offer helpful in-
sight in identifying situations in which the policy of the eminent do-
main clauses demands payment of compensation. When analysis of a
loss-producing measure indicates that government enterprise-en-
private airports, and to the detriment of both publicly and privately owned land in
the approach areas. Moreover, at another point, id. at 74, Professor Sax appears to
concede that benefits realized by governmental enterprises which operate in competi-
tion with private interests that are likewise benefited by regulatory measures may be
deemed "incidental" and thus not an occasion for requiring compensation. It is not
clear why airport zoning benefits are not "incidental" under this latter view.
The problem suggested in the text could be minimized if it were agreed that
governmental "enterprise" includes private resource utilization activities that are
devoted to public service functions (e.g., public utility companies and private trans-
portation businesses) and have the statutory power of eminent domain. Cf. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1001 (West 1954) ; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1237 (West 1955). Value enhance-
ment to such enterprises, including private airports, from regulatory measures would
thus require compensation to be paid. Professor Sax, however, makes no claim to
such an expanded application of his test; to adopt it would raise difficult collateral
problems of definition, loss allocation, and regulatory policy.
105 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
106 Sax, supra note 99, at 69.
107 See Comment, 45 TExAS L. REV. 96, 104-05 (1966).
108 The Virginia state government has long been actively engaged in programs
designed to promote and stimulate the sale of Virginia agricultural products, including
apples. See VA. CODE §§ 3.1-685-88 (Repl. Vol. 1966), formerly §§ 1250-53
(1924) (state promotion of marketing of agricultural products) ; VA. CODE § 3.1-635
(RepI. Vol. 1966) (promotion of Virginia apple industry through State Apple Com-
mission). The apple industry has long been a major feature of Virginia's economy.
See Miller v. State Entomologist, 146 Va. 175, 135 SE. 813, 814 (1926), aff'd sub
nom. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See generally, 3 Am. JUR. 2d, Agriculture
§§ 16-47 (1962).
109 Sax, supra note 99, at 69 n.154.
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hancement is a substantial result, but that arbitral consequences are
minimal, justification for cost-distribution is usually plain. But, this
approach fails to point out when compensation may properly be de-
nied, for in the converse situation a withholding of compensation
may significantly frustrate the underlying policy of prevention of
tyrannical government. The exercise of "arbitral" power, it should
be noted, does not always represent an objective and disinterested
consideration and adjustment of competing private interests; on the
contrary, it may constitute an unmitigated exercise of political clout
by dominant private interests seeking to acquire benefits at the ex-
pense of impotent private interests-the arbitrary tyranny of the
majority. Moreover, even assuming disinterested objectivity, it is
difficult to perceive why it is less arbitrary or tyrannical to benefit
some members of society at the expense of others merely because
the interests being benefited are represented in privately owned
rather than publicly owned ("enterprise") resources. 1 °
(6) The "fairness" test. In a notable essay exploring the ethical
foundations of compensation policy, Professor Frank Michelman has
recently concluded that the soundest guide to inverse compensability
lies in the philosophical idea of "justice as fairness," as corroborated
by utilitarian social policy."' The argument is far too complex to
yield to easy summarization. Essentially, the concept of "fairness" is
used by Michelman in a specialized sense. Assuming informed and
perceptive actors, a denial of compensation is not deemed to be unfair
if a disappointed claimant "ought to be able to appreciate how such
decisions might fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a lesser
long-run risk to people like him than would any consistent practice
which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision." 12 The impor-
tance of the claimant's ability to "appreciate" the relative risks re-
flects the utilitarian theory that loss of optimum productivity is a
normal consequence of social demoralization caused by capricious
governmental interference with the security of shared expectations
relating to resource allocations.'
110 See Michelman, supra note 55, at 1201.
111 Michelman, supra note 55.
112 Id. at 1223. The "risks" to be compared under this test are defined in
sophisticated fashion. One, which may result from liberal compensation practice, is
that overall costs will be so great as to require discontinuance of desirable govern-
ment projects, with a consequent general diminution in the total output of social
benefits which would otherwise be shared by the claimant. Another, associated with
less liberal compensation practice, is that the claimant will bear such a concentrated
and uncompensated loss as to preclude him, either wholly or in part, from sharing in
the general social benefits emanating from government projects in general. See id. at
1222-23.
113 Id. at 1212-13.
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This approach to compensability suggests that private losses
should be compensable when the relative magnitude of the harm
forced upon specific individuals is great, the compensating social ad-
vantages are minimal, and the settlement costs of paying compensa-
tion are reasonably bearable.'1 4 Conversely, the arguments favoring
noncompensability tend to be stronger when there are obvious offset-
ting benefits, or the burdens are relatively slight and widely diffused
so that the substantive and procedural costs of compensation are rela-
tively large in proportion to the social advantage to be secured by
payment of such compensation." 5
The fairness test, properly understood, provides a somewhat ab-
stract and illusive theoretical base for analysis of specific problems of
inverse liability. Even its author readily agrees that its generality
and nonspecificity make it difficult to entertain as a practical test of
compensability or as a rule of judicial decision." 6 Yet, regarded pri-
marily as a guide to legislative policy, the central idea of the fairness
test is a useful adjunct to the formulation of policy criteria. That
idea, briefly stated, is that eminent domain law, and its remedial fea-
ture of inverse condemnation liability, are primarily concerned with
preventing apparently capricious redistributions of community re-
sources through the consequences of governmental decision-making.
INVERSE CONDEMNATION GOALS AND POLICY CRITERIA
It is clear from the scholarly literature as well as the decisional
law that no consensus presently exists as to how, and by what stan-
dards, a viable line can be best drawn to mark the boundary between
compensable and noncompensable property injuries resulting from
government action. The issue, it is submitted, is still at a point of de-
velopment where it is more readily amenable to ad hoc pragmatic
analysis than to conceptually symmetrical generalization.
Individualized consideration of recurring aspects of the inverse
problem has been the principal responsibility of the courts, as case af-
ter case has been presented for decision over the years. The judicial
line has not always been an unwavering one marked by exceptional
consistency or clarity of thought. Decisional law, however, provides
substantial resources, in the form of judicially formulated statements
of the goals of inverse condemnation policy, that serve to help iden-
tify the broader criteria relevant to legislative improvement. These
114 Id. at 1223.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1245-53.
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goals, and the related policy criteria associated with them, are the
product of nearly a century of litigation in which the nature of the
contending interests and the persuasiveness of the competing argu-
ments have been repeatedly reviewed and tested. They surely
deserve a respectful hearing.
The central thrust of the decisional law in California has related
to the problem of according substantial meaning to the innovative
constitutional concept of "damaging" for public use."' The "dam-
age" clause was added in 1879 with the clear intent of its proponents
to expand liability beyond what had been included within the original
notion of "taking."11 8 The problem which has engaged the courts, for
the most part, has been how far beyond earlier limits liability can be
extended without thereby opening the vaults of the public treasury
too widely to inverse claimants." 9
Beneath the often muddled and disorderly array of inverse
cases, one can readily perceive the primary elements of the conflict.
On the one hand is the interest in encouraging the full use of govern-
mental powers for the general public welfare, unimpeded by improvi-
dent or crippling financial drains imposed to pay compensation for in-
juries sustained by owners of private property adversely affected by
public programs and activities. The bedrock foundation of this inter-
est is the general conviction that even the most affluent society can-
117 The principal highpoints in the case law development, following the adoption
of the "or damaged" clause as part of the Constitution in 1879, can be traced through
Reardon v. City & County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885). (The fol-
lowing cases are listed in order of decision.) Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618,
42 P. 240 (1895); Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024
(1917) ; McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 67, 4 P.2d 139 (1931) ; Archer
v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941) ; Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d
713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818
(1943); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); House v. Los
Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 (1944); Bauer v.
County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955); People ex rel. Department of
Pub. Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519 (1960), 5 Cal. Rptr. 151; People
ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 363 (1960); Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962);
Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903
(1964) ; and Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1965).
118 See Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The
Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727, 771-76 (1967).
119 See, especially, People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943)
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943). But compare Albers
v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965)
(greater ability of county treasury to absorb and redistribute losses from landslide
triggered by construction of county road treated as significant reason for imposing
inverse liability upon county).
120 This appraisal of the decisional law is widely shared. See authorities cited
supra, note 15.
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not feasibly assume the costs of socializing all of the private losses
which flow from the activities of organized government.121 It is
thus assumed that some uncompensated losses of values identified
with property are an inevitable and hence justifiable part of the
cost of social progress, or alternatively, that the net long-term in-
crease in community benefits flowing from public enterprises and
collective decision-making will ultimately offset or exceed those
losses.
On the other hand, there is also a deeply rooted social interest in
protection of private property values together with the socially stabi-
lizing influences and entrepreneurial incentives deemed to be associ-
ated with such values, from undue impairment by forced contribution
of a disproportionate share of the burdens of community progress. 122
The strength of this interest is underscored by the fact that it is ex-
plicitly embodied in the constitutional ethic of the eminent domain
clauses themselves. 28
A preliminary statement of the policy criteria relevant to resolu-
tion of this fundamental conflict of interests commences with recogni-
tion of the fact that particular governmental claims to freedom from
inverse liability are seldom of equal weight or persuasiveness. Famil-
iar decisions illustrate the truism that very substantial losses of prop-
erty values-even to the point of total destruction-are sometimes
held to be noncompensable under constitutional standards. 124 The
social interest to be served by a "taking" or "damaging" of private
property seemingly may, in certain instances, outweigh the constitu-
tional policy of paying for it. The usual doctrinal formulation of this
result is couched in the language of "police power," a rubric for non-
compensability whose counterpoint is usually described as "eminent
121 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1178-79 (1967);
Norvell, Recent Trends Affecting Compensable and Noncompensable Damages, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (South-
western Legal Found. ed. 1963).
122 See Michelman, supra note 121, at 1212-18.
123 See United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (Douglas, J.): "The
political ethics . . . in the fifth amendment reject confiscation as a measure of
justice." Moreover, it is dear that the inverse condemnation remedy extends beyond
those situations in which the public entity could have instituted, but did not com-
mence, an eminent domain proceeding to obtain an adjudication of the owner's
damages in advance. See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional
Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3, 4-5.
124 See, e.g., United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952)
(total destruction of oil refinery and storage facilities); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915) (land value reduced from $800,000 to $60,000 by use regulation
banning brickyard operation); Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
36 (1962) (value of land substantially destroyed by zoning ordinance).
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domain power. '  In effect, eminent domain begins where police
power ends. 26 However, to postulate a legal continuum along which
"police power" (i.e., noncompensability of resulting property dam-
age) gradually, by degrees, merges into and becomes "eminent do-
main power" (i.e., compensation must be paid) is to propose not a
test for, but a description of results. Moreover, a description which
seeks to rationalize holdings of compensability vel non as mere differ-
ences of degree is scarcely explanatory and implies the existence of
unarticulated decisional factors. 12 7 It also tends to obscure often sig-
nificant differences in the qualitative nature of the governmental in-
terests being asserted.
1 28
Private interests embodying significant social and economic val-
ues likewise assert claims, in the context of inverse condemnation lit-
igation, which vary in weight and persuasiveness. 29 Here, too, judi-
cial reasoning is characterized by circularity in many instances, with
determinations favoring or denying compensation normally expressed
as a conclusion that "property" has or has not been taken or dam-
aged. This dependence upon conceptualisms tends to obscure the un-
derlying issue of why the particular private interest should prevail
over the public interest to which it is opposed in the circumstances at
hand.
The comparative importance to be accorded the claimant's inter-
est presumably reflects a judicial assessment of its economic charac-
teristics and social significance in the hierarchy of accepted commu-
nity values, discounted in proportion to the countervailing values rep-
resented in the public interest at stake. For example, the policy of
preserving established geographic interrelationships between the vari-
ous localities within the community, as based upon time, distance,
125 See text accompanying notes 54-55, supra.
126 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962): "There
is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins." To the
same effect: Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF.
L. REv. 596, 608 (1954); Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain,
42 COLUMv. L. REv. 596, 612-14 (1942). For a discussion of the historical background
of the relationship between eminent domain and police power concepts, see Grant,
The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67
(1931) ; Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARv. L. Rlv. 366, 378 (1910).
127 See Mandelker, supra note 123, at 46.
128 See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-64 (1964)
Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 650,
664-69 (1958).
129 The variables often produce anomalous results. Compare Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (noise, smoke and vibration nuisance from overflying
planes held compensable) with Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir.
1962), cert. den. 371 U.S. 955 (1963) (similar consequences from nearby flights held
noncompensable in absence of actual overflights). For other seemingly paradoxical
results, see Michelman, supra note 121, at 1169-70.
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and ease of transportation, is often assimilated to a private interest of
abutting owners in access to the general system of community streets
by travel in both directions upon the street on which their property
abuts. 3 ° Thus, in cul-de-sac cases, compensation may be required for
impairing such access by "dead-ending" an existing street, thereby
limiting the property owners in the cul-de-sac to travel to the general
street system in one direction only."' Other types of street improve-
ments, such as median barriers, and the adoption of one-way-street
traffic regulations, may have precisely the same practical impact
upon abutting and nearby property owners as the creation of a physi-
cal cul-de-sac; yet, in this context, the claimant's interest is routinely
denied constitutional protection.'32
Although rarely articulated in judicial opinions, disparate re-
sults in factually similar cases such as those just cited are probably
best understood as representing a judicial conviction that private in-
terests are more deserving of protection in one instance than the
other, that the public interest differs significantly in the two situa-
tions, or that the relative significance of the competing interests is re-
garded as altered by the change in facts.
The judicial calculus that produces variations in results on these
bases is not likely to be explainable by any single set of policy postu-
lates. The preceding discussion strongly implies that the factual ele-
ments in the equation are variables in both a quantitative and quali-
tative sense, and that the policy considerations against which they are
assessed are themselves subject to differences of emphasis and per-
suasiveness in different settings. The desirability of statutory guide-
lines to improve predictability is obvious; the historical evidence,
however, suggests that such guidelines should, like the decisional law,
reflect the lessons of experience and practical realities as much, or
more, than the demands of logical consistency.
The experience disclosed in the case law, together with its distil-
lation in the scholarly studies reviewed above, suggest certain gener-
alities about inverse condemnation policy that should be useful in ap-
praising existing law as well as proposals for legislative change. To
be sure, these policy criteria cannot take into account all of the
variables that affect their usefulness and reliability in particular situ-
130 See Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal. Rptr.
903 (1964) ; Valenta v. County of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 2d 669, 394 P.2d 725, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 909 (1964).
131 Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., supra note 130; 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT
DoAI § 6.32[2] (3d rev. ed. 1963).
132 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d
519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960); R. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 53-58
(1963).
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ations. Their utility is derived chiefly from the fact that they consti-
tute an agenda of salient considerations that are relevant to the devis-
ing of a rational body of inverse condemnation law. The following
criteria are deemed significant in this respect:
First, a substantial degree of legal protection should be given to
reasonable reliance by individuals upon the relative permanence of
existing resource distribution patterns, and reasonable expectations
that existing institutional arrangements conducive to the preservation
of established values will not be substantially disturbed in the inter-
est of the general welfare without a fair and equitable allocation of
costs. 8 The historical reasons for the addition of the "or damaged"
clause to state constitutions is evidence of the importance of this reli-
ance element in the prevailing conception of inverse condemnation li-
ability.'
3 4
Yet, it is only those expectations of institutional and distribu-
tional stability which are "reasonable" that command legal protection
most insistently. The law of eminent domain was never intended to
prevent necessary changes in resource allocations to further public
programs and public policies, but only to impose a rational condition
of just compensation as the price for changes which, absent compen-
sation, would appear to consist of arbitrary exploitation. 1 5 Accord-
ingly, the notion of "reasonable" expectations may be deemed to in-
clude an implicit understanding that certain kinds of governmental
action may properly be undertaken without compensation for result-
ing private economic losses. 36 In others, expectations regarding sta-
bility of existing conditions may be qualified by realization that in
133 See Michelman, supra note 121, at 1203-12; Kratovil & Harrison, supra note
126, at 612-15. Perhaps the most striking examples of reliance interests are found in
the cases dealing with constitutional protections accorded to nonconforming uses.
See, e.g., Graham, Legislative Techniques for the Amortization of the Nonconforming
Use: A Suggested Formula, 12 WAYNE L. R~v. 435 (1966); Comment, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 354 (1966).
134 See Van Alstyne, supra note 118, at 771-76.
135 E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 416 (1922)
(Holmes, J.): "The protection of private property in the 5th amendment presup-
poses that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for
such use without compensation. . . . We are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."
136 For example, there is probably a fairly widespread general understanding
that governmental action to eliminate aggravated nuisances and other serious menaces
to health and safety are permissible noncompensable exercises of the "police power."
See Michelman, supra note 121, at 1236; Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 73 (1950). Destruction
of private property to prevent the spread of a conflagration, see Bowditch v. City
of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879), or to preclude it from falling into enemy hands
during wartime, see Annot., 97 L. Ed. 164 (1953), are also probably understood to
be noncompensable. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 63, 77-80.
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the event of certain kinds of governmentally caused losses, the consti-
tutional norm of fair and equitable cost allocation does not require
payment of pecuniary compensation. 37
It should also be recognized that the policy of protecting the reli-
ance interests of property owners is generally fully applicable to gov-
ernmental entities as well as natural persons in their role as owners
and users of property.'38 Except, perhaps, where disparities of size or
of incidence of political or functional responsibilities may signifi-
cantly distort the normal relationships between property owners, 39
the reasonable expectations of public entities as to the varieties of
uses to which their property may be put without incurring liability to
neighboring property owners are presumptively as deserving of legal
137 At least two situations appear to exist where noncompensability of private
losses seems generally acceptable as not unfair from the viewpoint of equitable cost
allocation. First, where compensating benefits are fairly obvious, or private losses are
either relatively trivial or widely shared throughout the community, individualized
claims for damages generally are not advanced. This assumption appears to be at the
root of the distinction, widely recognized, between noncompensability of "conse-
quential," and compensability of "special," damages in inverse condemnation litiga-
tion. See Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L.
REv. 596, 612-13 (1942) ; 4 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 14.1, 14.1[1], 14.4 (3d
rev. ed. 1962). In the oft-quoted expression by Justice Holmes, "Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). Secondly, private owners may, upon occasion,
deliberately assume the risk of detrimental governmental action for speculative in-
vestment purposes, as where a land developer buys scenic land along a freeway in the
planning stage at a market discounted price because of the widely known risk of
imposition of development restrictions, or an individual purchases a residence in the
approach zone of an existing airport at a price which reflects the market assessment
of its attendant noise problems as well as the expectation of rezoning for industrial
use. See Michelman, supra note 121, at 1237-38.
138 The concept of reasonable expectations necessarily takes into account the
anticipated range of permissible activities in which other property owners are privi-
leged to engage. Thus, numerous decisions affirm the rule that a public entity, as a
property owner, incurs no liability for using its property in a manner in which private
persons similarly situated could use theirs without incurring liability. See, e.g.,
Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603, 364 P.2d
840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961); Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119
P.2d 1 (1941). But see Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129,
42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965).
139 Governmental functions, because of their scope and volume, may often ex-
pose private property owners to risks unlike those normally attendant upon private
activities, and of a magnitude which greatly exceeds the foreseeable consequences of
privately caused harms. In such cases, one might well expect the development of a
special body of law relating to inverse condemnation liability which does not rest
upon private tort analogies. See, e.g., Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d
250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965) (destruction of millions of dollars worth
of residential properties by landslide induced by county road construction project);
Reardon v. City & County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885) (injury to
private buildings caused by shifting of unstable soil as result of city street project).
See also, Clement v. State Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950)
(flooding caused by diversion of natural stream flow in connection with construction
of major flood control project).
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consideration and protection as the similar expectations of private cit-
izens. Nothing in eminent domain policy suggests that the law should
deliberately discriminate in its normative treatment of public as com-
pared with private property owners similarly situated.
Second, the concept of "just compensation" assumes that it is
constitutionally improper, in general, for government to undertake to
benefit one citizen at the expense of another. 4 Accordingly, in the
absence of persuasive contrary reasons in particular cases or particu-
lar categories of cases, the adverse economic impact of public pro-
grams and public improvements normally should be distributed over
the public at large which is presumably benefited thereby, and
should not be borne in disproportionate degree by individual property
owners or discrete and limited groups of property owners. Since many
public activities involve inherent but often avoidable risks of disrup-
tion of settled private investments and of reasonable private expecta-
tions regarding uses of available resources, 4' this policy favoring
normal compensability for resulting harms tends to act as a brake
against insensitive or over-enthusiastic administration. It encourages
careful planning and more adequately considered choices between
operational alternatives.
However, it must be kept in mind that public projects ordinarily
tend to confer benefits, albeit intangible and difficult to measure in
140 See, e.g., Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350-51, 144 P.2d 818,
823 (1943): ". . . the policy underlying the eminent domain provision in the Con-
stitution is to distribute throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the in-
dividual by the making of the public improvements. . . . 'The tendency under our
system is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community; and it seems very
difficult in reason to show why the State should not pay for property which it
destroys or impairs the value, as well as for what it physically takes. . .. .' " (Quoting
from T. SEDGWICK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 462-63 (2d ed. 1874);
Michelman, supra note 121, at 1180-81.
141 Avoidance techniques generally involve choices between alternate means for
promoting the same basic goals. For example, the risk of creating a compensable
disruption of residential tranquillity through airport development, see Griggs v. Al-
legheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), may be minimized by location selection, runway
layout and design, advance acquisition of adequate avigation easements in lands
beneath projected approach areas, coordination of zoning and land-use planning with
airport development, and enforcement of noise abatement programs in the course of
actual airport operations. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY AGENCIES, INVESTIGATION AND STUDY
OF AiRCRAFT NOISE PROBLEMS, H.R. REP. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 27-28 (1963).
For available techniques of damage avoidance and reduction in highway planning,
see, e.g., Mandelker, Planning the Freeway: Interim Controls in Highway Programs,
1964 DUKE L.J. 439; Waite, Techniques of Land Acquisition for Future High-
way Needs, HIGHWAY RESEARCH RECORD, No. 8, p. 60 (1963). Cf. Ward Concrete
Prod. Co. v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 149 Cal. App. 2d 840, 847-48,
309 P.2d 546, 551 (1957), stating that "in the absence of any compelling emergency
or the pressure of public necessity, the courts will be slow to invoke the doctrine of
police power to protect public agencies [from liability in inverse condemnation] in
those cases where damage to private parties can be averted by proper construction
and proper precautions in the first instance."
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some cases, as well as to impose burdens. 42 The scope of the cost al-
location function which feasibly may be assumed by the law in in-
verse condemnation should thus take into account the relative inci-
dence of both benefits and burdens. An approximate equivalence of
burdens and benefits experienced by a property owner would, for ex-
ample, suggest absence of net compensable damage. 4 '
Third, governmental liability for just compensation for a "tak-
ing" or "damaging" of private property must necessarily be sub-ject to rational limitations, so that socially desirable governmental
policies and programs are not unduly deterred.'44 The exercise of
public power for the public good inevitably impinges with varying ef-
fect upon different individuals and their property. Acceptance of full
liability for all such property injuries could conceivably multiply
governmental liabilities and the costs of their administration to a fis-
cally crippling degree, discouraging essential as well as merely desir-
able public improvements and regulatory programs. 4 ' The goal of a
fair, politically acceptable, and economically justifiable allocation of
public resources thus presupposes the need for confining inverse con-
demnation liabilities within reasonably clear and ascertainable limits.
The limits of fiscal acceptability generally should represent the
points at which the policy of fairness in cost allocation is outweighed
by the need for substantially unimpeded pursuit of governmental ob-jectives. Where those points cannot be ascertained with reasonable
economy of effort or defined with reasonable precision, a measure of
legislative arbitrariness in prescribing the limits of compensability
may well be justified as an approximation of fairness. 4 "
142 See 3 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.62 (3d rev. ed. 1965). The gen-
erally favorable impact of freeway development upon nearby land values is discussed
in Hess, The Influence of Modern Transportation on Values-Freeways, ASSESSOR'S J.
26 (Dec. 1965).
143 The statement in the text assumes, of course, that no part of the owner's
land has been taken. Where there is a partial taking, "special" benefits are routinely
considered as an offset against severance damages accruing to the remainder of the
parcel. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248(3) (West Supp. 1966). See generally, Haar &
Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L. RV. 833(1963) ; Gleaves, Special Benefits: Phantom of the Opera, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 245 (1965).
144 Compare Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 354, 144 P.2d 818, 825(1943), "We do not fear that permitting recovery in cases of cul-de-sacs created in a
municipality will seriously impede the construction of improvements, assuming the
fear of such an event is real rather than fancied" (majority opinion), with id. at 380,
144 P.2d at 839, "The cost of making such improvements may be prohibitive now
that new rights are created for owners of property abutting on streets . . ." (dissent)
(Traynor, J.).
145 See Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 380, 144 P.2d 818, 839
(1943) (Traynor, J., dissenting). Total "settlement costs" should include not only
the actual outlays necessary to settle compensation claims, but also the "dollar value
of the time, effort, and resources that would be required" to reach appropriate settle-
ments in both the particular claims under consideration and others arising from the
same or like circumstances. See Michelman, supra note 121, at 1214.
146 See Michelman, supra note 121, at 1253-56; STAFF OF HousE COMm. ON
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Fourth, the need to keep inverse condemnation costs within
manageable bounds commensurate with available fiscal resources is
minimized to the extent that feasible loss-shifting mechanisms are
available.'47 For example, the private losses that may result from the
destruction of a building to create a fire break that will contain a con-
flagration will, in most instances, be absorbed by fire insurance which
has already distributed the risk among property owners in the form
of premiums. 48 Similarly, the inverse condemnation liabilities result-
ing from excessive noise and vibration of jet aircraft'4 9 may, at least
in part, be shifted to airport users in the form of fees and charges
rather than spread over the taxpayers in general.15° If the private
losses imposed by governmental action can be readily absorbed else-
where, and their incidence shifted away from the public fisc to non-
tax resources by market forces or other institutional devices, the
problem of fairness in cost allocation may be resolved without the
inhibiting spectre of governmental paralysis. Loss-shifting alone,
however, does not provide an occasion for increased inverse liabil-
ities; it merely enlarges the scope of policy options open to the
legislature in formulating rules to govern the incidence and practical
operation of inverse liability.' 5'
Fifth, the administration of inverse liability should be character-
ized to the optimum degree by ease of predictability and economy of
disposition, so that negotiated settlements are facilitated and litiga-
tion reduced or discouraged. 152 Statutory standards should be formu-
lated with an eye to simplicity, clarity and efficiency. The principles
PUBLIC WORKS, STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY
REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., 113, 130-34 (Comm. Print 1964). Cf. Note, 3 HARv. J. LEGIS. 445
(1966).
147 Cf. Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463, 500-13 (1963) (loss-shifting policy relative to government tort
liability).
148 Standard form fire insurance policies in California are required to include
coverage for losses sustained as the result of the acts of civil authorities involving
"destruction at the time of and for the purpose of preventing the spread of fire," with
some exceptions. CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1955).
149 See cases cited, note 129 supra.
150 See generally, Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise, 30 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 207 (1964).
151 In one sense, the administration of inverse condemnation is primarily con-
cerned with the problem of incidence rather than extent of liability. The losses
caused by governmental activity necessarily fall upon someone and constitute a
charge against the total resources of the community, except to the extent they may
be shifted to persons outside the community. Since the bulk of such losses will ordi-
narily be locally absorbed, loss-shifting policy appears to involve an assessment of
alternative methods for distributing the burdens accompanying governmental activity.
152 See generally, Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, in 5
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 311-30 (Cal. Law Revision Comm'n ed.
1963).
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of substance and procedure adopted in line with this policy should be
calculated to provide practical and workable guidelines for claims ne-
gotiators and attorneys,'158 recognizing implicitly that the law cannot
afford to be unduly particularistic in its application.5 Moreover, as
administrative economies are achieved, public agencies should be en-
abled to plan more effectively for the most efficient use of available
funds.
Sixth, the particulars of any legislative program relating to in-
verse condemnation should avoid disturbing existing rules of settled
law except where clearly justified by policy considerations of sub-
stantial importance. 55 The formulation of novel rules of law, not
grounded in familiar principles or their application, tends to create
uncertainty and to encourage litigation. Thus, not only should exist-
ing statutory and decisional law be the starting point for development
of a legislative program, but care should be taken to avoid creation of
broad and nebulous new areas of possible inverse liability through
use of unduly general statutory language. On the other hand, when
153 Authorization of flexible administrative adjustment of claims against federal
government agencies has been a successful feature of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
tending to reduce court litigation. See Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability for Per-
sonal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1325, 1358-62 (1954); McLeod, Ad-
ministrative Settlement of Claims, JAG J. 5 (Feb. 1953). By recent statutory amend-
ment, dollar maximums upon administrative tort settlements by federal agencies have
been repealed, although settlements exceeding $25,000 require the approval of the
Attorney General. 80 Stat. 306 (1966), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 346 (1966). See Note, 11 ST. Louis L.J. 117 (1966). The California Tort Claims
Act of 1963 likewise authorized considerable flexibility of administrative adjustment
and disposition of small tort claims. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 935.2-35.6 (West 1966);
VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY § 8.44 (1964).
154 Substantive policy may, in some cases, approve payment of compensation
that is not constitutionally required under prevailing judicial interpretations. Ex-
perience suggests that fixed, albeit arbitrary, statutory limits upon the amount of
compensation payable under these authorizations may be helpful by narrowing the
range of fiscal dispute and negotiation. See CAL. AGRIc. CODE § 239 (West 1954)
(limiting statutory indemnity for slaughter of tubercular cattle); Patrick v. Riley,
209 Cal. 350, 287 P. 455 (1930) (indemnity program held constitutionally valid, and
not a gift of public funds, on ground it tended to promote effective administration of
disease eradication objective, even though uncompensated slaughter of cattle would
also be constitutionally permissible). Recent legislation authorizing payment of reloca-
tion expenses for persons displaced by state highway right-of-way acquisition and
clearance activities includes statutory limitations upon the relocation assistance legally
payable. CAL. STS. & HwYs. CODE §§ 135.1, 135.2 (West Supp. 1966). See U.S. AD-
VISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREAT-
MENT OF PEOPLE AND BUSINESSES DISPLACED BY GOVERNMENTS 111-14 (1965).
155 Compare the legislative determination, in formulating the California Tort
Claims Act of 1963, to predicate the principal statutory immunities of public entities
upon the settled body of case law relating to the "discretionary" immunity of public
officers. See Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Recommendation Relating to Sovereign
Immunity: Number 1-Tort Liability of Public Entities and Public Employees, in 4
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 801, 812, 814-19 (Cal. Law Revision
Comm'n d. 1963).
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existing law tends to work injustice or to frustrate sound considera-
tions of policy, departures therefrom should be readily undertaken.
Seventh, public entities should be accorded the maximum degree
of flexibility of administrative action to avoid inverse liability where
possible, and to mitigate its extent when avoidance is not feasible.
For example, the law should provide ample scope for alternative
remedies to damage awards.'56 The funding of inverse liabilities
should also be facilitated through a variety of techniques in order
to assure payment to the injured claimant and minimize the ad-
verse impact of unexpectedly large judgments. 57
The task of critical application of these policy criteria (and, as
well, of others that reflection may discover) to the bewildering varie-
ties of inverse condemnation claims is indeed formidable. 58 It consti-
tutes, however, a worthy challenge to legislative statesmanship that,
met effectively, will bring the reality of law in action closer to its con-
stitutional ideals.
150 See Note, Eminent Domain-Rights and Remedies of an Uncompensated
Landowner, 1962 WASHa. U.L.Q. 210; Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 994, 1063-64 (1965).
157 To a considerable extent, adequate options are presently available to Cali-
fornia public entities for funding of liabilities in inverse condemnation. See CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 970.6 (West 1966) (installment payment of judgments), 975-978.8
(bond issues to fund judgments); VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT
LIABLrrr §§ 9.15-.17 (1964). The "catastrophe judgment" problem, especially in its
impact upon relatively small public entities, needs attention, however. See generally,
Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, in 5 REPORTS, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND STUDIES 308-11 (Cal. Law Revision Comm'n ed. 1963); Borchard, State
and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747, 751-52
(1934).
158 It can readily be argued, of course, that "policy-balancing" is a fruitless
exercise in semantics unless accompanied by agreement upon fundamental standards
by which to assign qualitative values to the policies perceived as relevant in specific
cases. It is deemed unlikely, however, that agreement could readily be achieved as to
the philosophical purposes of the compensation system or as to how these purposes
should best be translated into practical policy. But cf. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). The problem, however, does not appear to be of
crucial importance for the purposes of the study of which this article is a part. That
study seeks to examine existing compensation practices with an eye to practicable
statutory improvements in current, law. Accordingly, the most relevant policy criteria
are those which are likely to appeal or be persuasive to legislators collectively. In
this context, pragmatic assessments of what is feasible, appropriate, and politically
acceptable are necessarily more important influences than basic philosophical or
economic postulates. A modest but "workable" program of law revision, based upon
"practical" wisdom, may, after all, be preferable to an "ideal" program that is un-
attainable. Law revision, like politics, must be regarded as the art of the possible,
